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Abstract
The locking effect is a phenomenon which is unique to quantum information theory and
represents one of the strongest separations between the classical and quantum theories of infor-
mation. The Fawzi-Hayden-Sen (FHS) locking protocol harnesses this effect in a cryptographic
context, whereby one party can encode n bits into n qubits while using only a constant-size
secret key. The encoded message is then secure against any measurement that an eavesdropper
could perform in an attempt to recover the message, but the protocol does not necessarily meet
the composability requirements needed in quantum key distribution applications. In any case,
the locking effect represents an extreme violation of Shannon’s classical theorem, which states
that information-theoretic security holds in the classical case if and only if the secret key is the
same size as the message. Given this intriguing phenomenon, it is of practical interest to study
the effect in the presence of noise, which can occur in the systems of both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper. This paper formally defines the locking capacity of a quantum channel
as the maximum amount of locked information that can be reliably transmitted to a legitimate
receiver by exploiting many independent uses of a quantum channel and an amount of secret key
sublinear in the number of channel uses. We provide general operational bounds on the locking
capacity in terms of other well-known capacities from quantum Shannon theory. We also study
the important case of bosonic channels, finding limitations on these channels’ locking capacity
when coherent-state encodings are employed and particular locking protocols for these channels
that might be physically implementable.
1 Introduction
The security of a cryptographic primitive can be assessed according to different security criteria.
Most modern cryptosystems are computationally secure—that is, their security relies on the diffi-
culty of breaking them in a reasonable amount of time given available technologies. This is also
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the case for the enigma machines, a family of historical polyalphabetic ciphers in use during the
earlier half of the previous century—their security relied on the difficulty of uncovering patterns
hidden in pseudorandom sequences [8].
A stronger security criterion requires that an encrypted message is close to being statistically
independent of the corresponding unencrypted message, in which case one speaks of information-
theoretic security. For the case of classical systems, a good measure of correlation is the mutual
information between the unencrypted and encrypted message. If the mutual information vanishes,
the chance of successfully decrypting the message is exponentially small in the length of the mes-
sage. Any encryption scheme with such a property cannot perform any better than one-time pad
encryption, where a truly random key is used to encrypt (and decrypt) the message [44]. The
one-time pad guarantees information-theoretic security as long as the key is kept secret, it has the
same length as the message, and can be used only once. However, the fact that the secret key
should be the same length as the message imposes severe practical limitations on the use of the
one-time pad protocol.
On the other hand, it is now known that quantum mechanics gives a way around these limi-
tations. The locking effect is a phenomenon which is unique to quantum information theory [14]
and represents one of the most striking separations between the classical and quantum theories
of information. It is responsible for important revisions to security definitions for quantum key
distribution [32] and might even help to explain how both unitarity could be preserved and most of
the information leaking from an evaporating black hole could be inaccessible until the final stages
of evaporation [49, 15]. Quantum data locking occurs when the accessible information about a
classical message encoded into a quantum state decreases by an amount that is much larger than
the number of qubits of a small subsystem that is discarded [14]. A device that realizes a quantum
data locking protocol is called a quantum enigma machine [37].
Impressive locking schemes exist [23, 15, 18]. Suppose that a sender and receiver share a
constant number of secret key bits. Using these secret key bits, they can then encode an n-bit
classical message into n qubits such that an adversary who gains access to these n qubits, but who
does not know the secret key, cannot do much better than to randomly guess the message after
performing an arbitrary measurement on these n qubits.
However, the cryptographic applications of quantum data locking have to be “taken with a grain
of salt,” as they are only applicable if the distribution of the message is completely random from
the perspective of the adversary. Otherwise, the key size should increase by an amount necessary
to ensure that the distribution of the message becomes uniform. Moreover, one might say that the
strength of quantum data locking also exposes a weakness. Indeed, as a small key is sufficient for
encrypting a long message, the leakage of a small part of the secret key may allow an adversary
to uncover a disproportionate amount of information. For this reason, any cryptographic primitive
based on the locking effect (called a locking scheme), does not necessarily guarantee composable
security [32]. This also implies that quantum data locking cannot necessarily be used for secure
key distribution. The only exception is if the adversary has no option other than to perform a
collective measurement on the qubits in her possession just after she receives them.
As stated above, Shannon proved that such a locking effect is impossible classically [44]. That
is, when using only classical resources, a sender and receiver require a secret key whose size is
proportional to the size of the message in order for the eavesdropper to have a negligible amount
of information about the encrypted message. Thus, after Shannon’s result, information scientists
looked in a different direction in order to determine ways for communication systems to provide
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secrecy in addition to reliable transmission. In reality, all communication systems suffer from
physical-layer noise, and one might be able to determine the characteristics of the noise to a
legitimate receiver and to an untrusted eavesdropper. Such a model is known as the wiretap
channel [55], and it is well known now that if the noise to the eavesdropper is stronger than the
noise to the legitimate receiver, then it is possible to communicate error-free at a positive rate
such that the eavesdropper obtains a negligible amount of information about the messages being
transmitted.
2 Summary of results
In this paper, we consider the performance of locking protocols in the presence of noise, and as an
important application, we consider locking protocols for bosonic channels. There are two types of
noise to consider in any realistic locking protocol: that which affects the transmission to a legitimate
receiver and that which affects the eavesdropper’s system. Both are important to consider in any
realization of a quantum enigma machine.
We begin in Section 4 by reviewing the locking effect and a recently introduced quantum enigma
machine (QEM) from Ref. [37]. This QEM encodes a classical message into a single-photon state
spread over a collection of discrete modes and then decodes it by direct photodetection. The
encryption and decryption are realized by applying and inverting, respectively, a single multi-mode
passive linear-optical unitary transformation, selected uniformly at random from a set of such
transformations. Similar to historical enigma machines, QEMs can encrypt a long message using
an exponentially shorter secret key. However, unlike historical enigma machines which were only
computationally secure, quantum data locking implies security in the sense that the outcomes of
any eavesdropper measurement will be essentially independent of the message.
After the review, Section 5 provides a formal definition of the locking capacity of a quantum
channel. In short, a locking protocol uses a quantum channel n times (for some arbitrarily large
integer n) and has three requirements:
1. The receiver should be able to decode the transmitted message with an arbitrarily small error
probability.
2. The eavesdropper can recover only an arbitrarily small number of the message bits after
performing a quantum measurement on her systems.
3. The secret key rate is no more than sublinear in the number n of channel uses (for example,
logarithmic in n).
We define the locking capacity of a quantum channel to be the maximum rate at which it is possible
to lock classical information according to the above requirements. Changing the systems to which
the adversary has access leads to different notions of locking capacity, and we distinguish the notions
by naming them the weak locking capacity and the strong locking capacity. The difference between
the two is that, in the weak notion, the adversary is assumed to have access to only the channel
environment, while, in the strong case, we allow her access to the channel input. We emphasize
that when we use the term (weak or strong) “locking capacity” without any other modifiers, we
refer to the locking capacity of a quantum channel without additional resources such as classical
feedback. Most of the results reported here correspond to such a forward locking capacity. The
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locking capacity of channels with additional resources such as classical feedback remains largely
open. However, at the very least, we can already say that quantum key distribution protocols
provide lower bounds on the locking capacity in this setting.
We then find operational bounds on the locking capacity in terms of other well known capacities
studied in quantum Shannon theory, and we find other information-theoretic upper bounds on
the locking capacity. We prove that the locking capacity of an entanglement-breaking channel is
equal to zero, which demonstrates that a quantum channel should have some ability to preserve
entanglement in order for it to be able to lock information according to the above requirements.
We also show that any achievable locking rate is equal to zero whenever a given locking protocol
has a classical simulation. Furthermore, we find a class of channels for which the weak locking
capacity is equal to both the private capacity and quantum capacity. Finally, we discuss locking
protocols for some simple exemplary channels.
Section 6 establishes several important upper bounds on the locking capacity of channels when
restricting to coherent-state encodings. If it were possible to exploit coherent-state encodings to
perform locking at high rates, then this would certainly turn the locking effect from an interesting
theoretical phenomenon into one with practical utility. However, we are able to show that there
are fundamental limitations on the locking capacity when restricting to coherent-state encodings.
In particular, we prove that the “strong” locking capacity of any channel is no larger than log2(e)
locked bits per channel use whenever the encoding consists of coherent states (where e is the base
for the natural logarithm). We also prove that the “weak” locking capacity of a pure-loss bosonic
channel is no larger than the sum of its private capacity and log2(e).
In Section 7, we discuss an explicit protocol that uses a pulse position modulation encoding of
coherent states. We derive bounds on the security and key efficiency of this coherent-state locking
protocol and find that it has qualitative features analogous to the single-mode quantum enigma
machine in the presence of linear loss.
Finally, Section 8 presents our conclusions, a discussion of the scaling of the required physical
resources, and open questions for future research.
3 Notation
We briefly review some notation that we use in the rest of the paper. Let B(H) denote the algebra
of bounded linear operators acting on a Hilbert space H. The 1-norm of an operator X is defined
as
‖X‖1 ≡ Tr{
√
X†X}.
Let B(H)+ denote the subset of positive semidefinite operators (we often simply say that an operator
is “positive” if it is positive semidefinite). We also write X ≥ 0 if X ∈ B(H)+. An operator ρ is in
the set D(H) of density operators if ρ ∈ B(H)+ and Tr{ρ} = 1. The tensor product of two Hilbert
spaces HA and HB is denoted by HA⊗HB. Given a multipartite density operator ρAB ∈ HA⊗HB ,
we unambiguously write ρA = TrB{ρAB} for the reduced density operator on system A.
A linear map NA→B : B(HA) → B(HB) is positive if NA→B(σA) ∈ B(HB)+ whenever σA ∈
B(HA)+. Let idA denote the identity map acting on B(HA). A linear map NA→B is completely
positive if the map idR ⊗ NA→B is positive for a reference system R of arbitrary size. A linear
map NA→B is trace-preserving if Tr{NA→B(τA)} = Tr{τA} for all input operators τA ∈ B(HA). If
a linear map is completely positive and trace-preserving, we say that it is a quantum channel or
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quantum operation. For simplicity, we denote a quantum channel N : B(HA) 7→ B(HB) simply as
NA→B. Similarly, we denote an isometry U : HA 7→ HB ⊗HC simply as UA→BC .
The variational distance between two probability distributions p(x) and q(x) is defined as∑
x
|p(x)− q(x)|.
The trace distance between two quantum states ρ and σ is defined as follows:
‖ρ− σ‖1,
and it is a conventional measure used in quantum information theory to quantify the distinguisha-
bility of two quantum states. Clearly, when the two states are commuting, the trace distance is
equal to the variational distance between the two probability distributions corresponding to the
eigenvalues of ρ and σ.
The von Neumann entropy of a state ρ ∈ D(HA) is given byH(A)ρ := −Tr{ρ log ρ}. Throughout
this paper we take the logarithm base 2. For a tripartite state ρABC ∈ D(HABC), the quantum
mutual information and the conditional quantum mutual information are respectively given by:
I(A;B)ρ ≡ H(A)ρ +H(B)ρ −H(AB)ρ,
I(A;B|C)ρ ≡ I(A;BC)ρ − I(A;C)ρ,
where H(A)ρ denotes the von Neumann entropy of the reduced state ρA, for example.
4 Review of quantum data locking
A quantum data locking scheme can be implemented by a set of |K| unitary transformations
{Uk}k∈K acting on a Hilbert space HM of finite dimension |M| [14, 23, 15, 18]. (For the mo-
ment, we restrict ourselves to finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, but Definitions 1 and 2 appearing
later on allow for encoding information into infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces.) Alice encodes
|M| equiprobable messages by means of a set of orthonormal states {|m〉}m∈M defining a standard
basis in HM . The encryption is then made by applying a particular unitary Uk with k chosen
uniformly at random from K, and this unitary maps a standard basis state |m〉 into a state Uk|m〉.
The label k identifies the choice of the basis and plays the role of a secret key.
It is helpful to consider a particular classical-quantum state when reasoning about a quantum
data locking protocol. For such a state, we have two classical systems, the first associated with
Alice’s message and the second associated with the secret key, and a quantum system Q of dimen-
sion |M| corresponding to the quantum-encoded message of Alice. This classical-quantum state is
given by the following density matrix:
ρMKQ =
1
|M||K|
∑
m,k
|m,k〉〈m,k|MK ⊗
(
Uk|m〉〈m|U †k
)
Q , (1)
where the sets {|m〉} and {|k〉} are comprised of orthonormal states representing the message and
the secret key, respectively. The receiver Bob has access to the quantum system Q and the key
system K. We assume that an eavesdropper Eve only has access to the quantum system Q (for
example, before it gets passed along to the receiver Bob). The classical correlations between Alice’s
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message M and Bob’s systems K and Q can be quantified by the accessible information [40]. This
is defined as the maximum classical mutual information that can be extracted by performing local
measurements on the bipartite state:
Iacc(M ;KQ)ρ = max
MKQ→Y
I(M ;Y ) , (2)
where the maximization is taken over local measurement maps MKQ→Y and I(X;Y ) = H(X) +
H(Y )−H(XY ) is the mutual information, with H(Z) denoting the Shannon entropy of the random
variable Z [12].
The accessible information in (2) can never be larger than log2 |M|, due to the bound I(M ;Y ) ≤
log2 |M| which holds for any random variable Y . A particular strategy for achieving this upper
bound is for Bob first to perform the controlled unitary
∑
k |k〉〈k|K ⊗ (U †k)Q, leaving the state
1
|M||K|
∑
m,k
|m,k〉〈m,k|MK ⊗ |m〉〈m|Q.
He then simply measures in the basis {|m〉} to recover the messagem perfectly, so that his accessible
information is maximal, equal to log2 |M|.
To assess the security of the communication, let us consider the accessible information for a
party Eve who does not have access to the secret key. We consider the following reduced state:
ρMQ =
1
|M|
∑
m
|m〉〈m|M ⊗ 1|K|
∑
k
(
Uk|m〉〈m|U †k
)
Q , (3)
obtained by taking the partial trace over the key system in (1). The aim of Eve is to find an
optimal positive operator-valued measure (POVM) to maximize the classical mutual information.
It is sufficient to consider a POVM MQ→Y with rank-one measurement operators, i.e.,
{µy|φy〉〈φy|}, (4)
where each |φy〉 is a normalized vector and µy > 0 (the sufficiency of rank-one POVMs follows by a
data processing argument). We then find the following expression for Eve’s accessible information
about Alice’s message [14]:
Iacc(M ;Q)ρ = log2 |M| − min
ME→Y
∑
y
µy
|M||K|
∑
k
H(qyk) , (5)
where the probability distributions qyk have components q
m
yk = |〈φy |Uk|m〉|2. Notice that Eve’s
accessible information is written in terms of the minimum of the Shannon entropies H(qyk) =
−∑m qmyk log2 qmyk averaged over y and k.
While finding Eve’s optimal POVM is generally a difficult problem, one can obtain a good
upper bound by a convexity argument [14]. Furthermore, one can choose the encoding unitaries
uniformly at random according to the Haar measure [23, 18, 9, 15], and if one also adjoins to the
message a small ancilla system in a maximally mixed state [18], then it is possible to reduce the
adversary’s accessible information to become arbitrarily small. These latter results show that for
large enough |M| there exist data locking schemes with log2 |K| negligibly small in comparison to
log2 |M| and for which
Iacc(M ;Q)ρ ≪ Iacc(M ;KQ)ρ.
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That means that a relatively short secret key can be used to encrypt an exponentially longer
message. To be more precise, consider the results of [18], according to which for |M| large enough
there exist choices of |K| unitaries, with
log2 |K| = 4 log2 (ε−1) +O(log2 log2 (ε−1)) , (6)
such that
Iacc(M ;Q)ρ ≤ ε log2 |M| , (7)
for any ε > 0. Moreover, if one randomly chooses the |K| unitaries according to the Haar distri-
bution on the unitary group, the probability of picking up a set with this property approaches one
exponentially fast in the limit as |M| → ∞.
In quantum data locking, the removal of a subsystem reduces the accessible information by an
amount larger than the number of qubits removed. This is a purely quantum feature which has
no classical analog. For comparison, consider a classical counterpart of the quantum data locking
setting, in which Alice has access to a message variable M , Bob to an output random variable Y
and key variable K, while Eve has access only to Y . In the classical framework, the following
inequality holds
I(M ;Y K)− I(M ;Y ) = I(M ;K|Y ) ≤ H(K) ≤ log2 |K| . (8)
This inequality shows that in the classical framework, removal of the key variable K reduces the
mutual information by no more than log2 |K|.
In the quantum case as discussed above, this inequality can be violated by an arbitrarily large
amount by replacing the classical mutual information with the accessible information. A violation
of the classical inequality in (8) can be quantified in terms of the following ratios [14, 23]:
r1 =
Iacc(M ;Q)ρ
Iacc(M ;KQ)ρ
, (9)
r2 =
log2 |K|
Iacc(M ;KQ)ρ − Iacc(M ;Q)ρ . (10)
The first is the ratio of the accessible information without the secret key to that with the secret
key. The second is the ratio of the key length to the amount of information that Bob can unlock
by having access to the key. For a good locking scheme, both of these quantities should be small,
and the quantum data locking schemes discussed above are such that both r1 and r2 can be made
arbitrarily small. On the other hand, the inequality in (8) implies that r2 ≥ 1 for any locking
scheme that uses classical resources only. Notice that the one-time pad protocol has r2 = 1 because
the number of bits in the key is equal to the amount of unlocked information for Bob.
4.1 Quantum enigma machine
A particular example of a QEM was proposed in Ref. [37]. This QEM implements an optical
realization of quantum data locking, in which Alice exploits a pulse position modulation (PPM)
encoding using single-photon states over n optical modes [37]. The message states |m〉 = a†m|0〉
represent the states of a single photon occupying one out of a set of n bosonic modes with canonical
operators {am, a†m}m∈{1,...,n}. Thus, for this case, we have n = |M|. The unitaries {Uk}k∈K are
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realized as passive linear-optical transformations acting on n modes. The encryption through a
passive linear-optical unitary Uk transforms the message states into
|m〉k := Uk|m〉 =
n∑
m′=1
U˜
(m,m′)
k |m′〉 , (11)
where U˜k is the corresponding n × n unitary matrix acting on the mode labels. The effect of the
encryption is to spread a single photon coherently over n modes.
Let us first assume that Alice and Bob communicate via a noiseless quantum channel. Then
Bob receives the state prepared by Alice unperturbed. He decrypts the message by first applying
the inverse transformation U †k and then by performing photodetection on the modes {am}. We
assume that Eve may intercept the signal but she does not know which unitary has been used for
encryption. Then, a direct application of the results of [18] shows that Eve’s accessible information
can be made arbitrary small using a pre-shared secret key of length logarithmic in the length of
the message.
One natural application of a QEM is in synergy with standard quantum key distribution (QKD)
[5, 39]—that is, a relatively short secret key can be first established by QKD and then used to
encrypt a much (exponentially) longer message through the QEM. This combination of QKD and
QEM in an all-quantum-optical cryptosystem could possibly overcome the bit-rate limitations of
standard QKD, but more work is necessary to determine if this is the case.
Let us now suppose that Alice and Bob communicate through a pure-loss bosonic channel with
transmissivity η ∈ (0, 1) and Eve makes a passive wiretap attack on the communication line, hence
getting the photon lost in the channel with probability no larger than 1 − η. A simple feedback-
assisted strategy allows for Alice and Bob to use the same scheme even for transmissivity values
below 50%. Notice that the only effect of the pure-loss channel is to induce a probabilistic leakage
of the photon. Hence, each time Bob detects a photon (which happens with probability η) he can be
sure that he has correctly decrypted Alice’s message. On the other hand, if Bob’s photodetectors do
not produce a click (which happens with probability 1−η) he can request for Alice to resend. This
shows that with the help of a classical feedback channel Alice and Bob can attain the accessible
information
Iacc(M ;KQ)ρ = η log2 n . (12)
Although reduced, this value of the accessible information equals the maximum value achievable
through a pure-loss bosonic channel with a mean value of n−1 photons per mode [37, 19].
Lloyd argues that such a scheme should be secure in principle [37]. However, a critical assump-
tion for this security to hold is that Eve should attack each block that she receives independently,
in which case her accessible information is reduced by a factor 1− η when compared to the lossless
case. Indeed, an important assumption for the security of any locking protocol is that the distribu-
tion of the message is uniform from the perspective of the adversary. If this is not the case (as for
repeated transmission of the same message when it does not show up at the receiver’s end), then
the secret key needs to be large enough so that the distribution of the message becomes uniform
(see Proposition 4.16 in Ref. [17]).
Concerning the key efficiency of the protocol, we can estimate the key efficiency ratio as
r2 ≃ 4 log2 (ε
−1)
η log2 n
. (13)
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This expression implies that, although r2 can be made arbitrarily small by increasing n, the number
of bosonic modes needed to fulfill the key efficiency condition r2 < 1 grows exponentially with
decreasing r2 and η. This feature is first of all a consequence of the fact that the quantum data
locking scheme in [18] (similar conclusions are also obtained using the results of [23, 15]) requires
a high-dimensional Hilbert space. On top of that, there is the fact that the PPM encoding, as
remarked above, is highly inefficient as it encodes log2 n qubits into n optical modes.
According to Definition 1 below, this QEM is an instance of an (n,R, ε) weak locking protocol
(assisted by classical feedback) for the pure-loss bosonic channel with transmissivity η, with a
locking rate R = [η log2 n]/n. It is worthwhile to notice that, due to the inefficiency of PPM
encoding, the rate of this QEM approachs zero as n increases.
5 The locking capacity of a quantum channel
In this section, we take a more general approach to quantum data locking than that pursued in
prior work by defining the locking capacity of a quantum channel. Our goal is to understand the
locking effect in the setting of quantum Shannon theory, where a sender and receiver are given
access to n independent uses of a noisy quantum channel (where n is an arbitrarily large integer).
Their aim is to exploit some sublinear (in n) amount of secret key in order to lock classical messages
from an adversary, in the sense that this adversary will not be able to do much better than random
guessing when performing a quantum measurement to learn about the transmitted message. Also,
we demand that the legitimate receiver (who knows the value of the secret key) be able to recover
the classical message with an arbitrarily small probability of error. This leads us naturally to the
following formal definition of a locking protocol for a noisy channel:
Definition 1 (Weak locking protocol). An (n,R, ε) weak locking protocol for a channel NA→B con-
sists of encoding and decoding maps EMK→An and DBnK→Mˆ , respectively. The encoding EMK→An
acts on a message system M and a key system K and outputs the system An for input to n uses
of the channel. The decoding map D
BnK→Mˆ acts on the output systems B
n and the key system K
to produce a classical system Mˆ containing the receiver’s estimate of the message. Without loss
of generality, the encoding consists of |M||K| quantum states ρm,k, where |M| is the number of
messages and |K| is the number of key values. Furthermore, the decoding consists of |K| POVMs
{Λ(k)m }m∈M. The rate R = log2|M|/n and the parameter ε > 0. The protocol should satisfy the
following requirements:
1. Given the key, the receiver can decode the transmitted message well on average:
1
|M||K|
∑
m,k
Tr
{
Λ(k)m (NA→B)⊗n(ρm,k)
}
≥ 1− ε.
2. Let {Γy} be a POVM that Eve can perform in an attempt to learn about the message M .
After she performs this measurement, the joint classical-classical state of the message and
her measurement outcome is as follows:
1
|M|
∑
m
|m〉〈m|M ⊗
∑
y
Tr
{
Γy
(
1
|K|
∑
k
(NA→E)⊗n(ρm,k)
)}
|y〉〈y|Y ,
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where NA→E is the channel complementary to NA→B. Equivalently, the joint probability
distribution pM,Y (m, y) is equal to
pM,Y (m, y) =
1
|M| Tr
{
Γy
(
1
|K|
∑
k
(NA→E)⊗n(ρm,k)
)}
,
Our security criterion (see also Ref. [18]) is that, for any measurement outcome y of Eve, the
variational distance between the message distribution pM (m) and the distribution pM |Y (m|y)
for the message conditioned on any particular measurement outcome should be no larger than
ε: ∑
m
|pM (m)− pM |Y (m|y)| ≤ ε. (14)
The interpretation here is that Eve cannot do much better than to randomly guess the mes-
sage if all of the conditional distributions pM |Y (m|y) are indistinguishable from the message
distribution.
3. The secret key consumption grows sublinearly in the number n of channel uses.
In a weak locking protocol, it is assumed that the eavesdropper has access to the channel
environment only. A stronger locking protocol is obtained if we allow for the eavesdropper to have
access to the channel input (or, equivalently, to both the channel output and environment):
Definition 2 (Strong locking protocol). An (n,R, ε) strong locking protocol is similar to a weak
locking protocol, except that we allow for Eve to have access to the An systems, so that she can
perform a measurement on the An systems of the following state:
1
|M|
∑
m
|m〉〈m|M ⊗ 1|K|
∑
k
(ρm,k)An .
We then demand that the variational distance as in (14) can be made less than an arbitrarily small
positive constant ε.
Remark 3. One could alternatively allow for the adversary to have access to the output of the
channel, but we do not explore such a possibility in this paper.
Remark 4. The Fannes-Audenaert inequality [16, 2] for continuity of entropy implies that if (14)
holds, then we get the following bound on Eve’s accessible information:
Iacc(M ;E
n) ≤ h2(ε/2) + εnR/2, (15)
where h2 is the binary entropy and n and R are as in Definition 1. In more detail, recall the
Fannes-Audenaert inequality for continuity of entropy:
T ≡ 12‖ρ− σ‖1 =⇒ |H(ρ)−H(σ)| ≤ h2(T ) + T log(d− 1),
where h2 is the binary entropy and d is the dimension of the states. Applying this to the condition
in (14) gives
H(M)−H(M |Y = y) ≤ h2(ε/2) + ε2 log(|M| − 1) (16)
≤ h2(ε/2) + εnR/2. (17)
Since the above inequality holds for any measurement of Eve, averaging it with respect to the dis-
tribution pY (y) gives the inequality in (15).
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Remark 5. If desired, one can demand further for the secret key rate of an (n,R, ε) weak or strong
locking protocol to be consumed at a particular sublinear rate (for example, a logarithmic number
of secret key bits or perhaps
√
n secret key bits for n channel uses). However, the present paper
establishes several upper bounds on locking capacity in an IID setting, and these bounds converge
to the same quantity in the large n limit regardless of which sublinear rate is chosen. Also, the
FHS protocol [18] is very strong, in the sense that it uses such a small amount of secret key. Thus,
in light of these two observations it seems reasonable to define locking capacity in such a coarse-
grained manner. However, other characterizations of locking capacity in a finite blocklength setting
or in a one-shot setting might change depending on the amount of secret key allowed (so it would
be necessary to specify in more detail the amount of secret key allowed).
Remark 6. Observe that an (n,R, ε) strong locking protocol is also an (n,R, ε) weak locking pro-
tocol, but the other implication is not necessarily true.
Remark 7. The security and key efficiency ratios become arbitrarily small for a strong locking
protocol. Indeed, from the fact that Iacc(M ;A
n) ≤ h2(ε/2) + εnR/2 and the fact that the receiver
can decode with the key, so that Iacc(M ;B
nK) ≈ log2|M|, it follows that the security ratio r1 ≤
h2(ε/2)/(nR) + ε/2. Also, since we require the key to be sublinear in the message length, it follows
that the key efficiency ratio r2 = o(n)/O(n), which vanishes in the limit as n→∞.
In what follows, we use the modifier “weak” or “strong” only when we need to distinguish
between them.
Definition 8 (Achievable rate for locking). A rate R is achievable if ∀ δ, ε > 0 and sufficiently
large n, there exists an (n,R− δ, ε) locking protocol.
Definition 9 (Locking capacity). The locking capacity L(N ) of a quantum channel is the supremum
of all achievable rates:
L(N ) ≡ sup{R | R is achievable}.
Let LW (N ) and LS(N ) denote the weak and strong locking capacity, respectively.
5.1 Relation of the locking capacity to other capacities
Let Q(N ), P (N ), and C(N ) denote the quantum [41, 42, 4, 3, 36, 45, 13], private [13, 10], and clas-
sical [26, 43] capacities of a quantum channel N , respectively. By employing operational arguments,
we can determine that the following bounds hold
Q(N ) ≤ P (N ) ≤ LW (N ) ≤ C(N ). (18)
Indeed, for any channel, its quantum capacity is less than the private classical capacity because any
scheme for quantum communication can be used for private classical communication such that the
classical information is protected from the environment of the channel. Furthermore, the inequality
P (N ) ≤ LW (N ) holds because any (n,R, ε) private classical communication protocol satisfies the
three requirements of a weak locking protocol [13, 10]. Finally, the requirements of a weak locking
protocol are more restrictive than those for classical communication, so that LW (N ) ≤ C(N ).
Operational arguments and the existence of the Fawzi-Hayden-Sen (FHS) locking protocol [18]
also lead to the following bounds on the strong locking capacity:
Q(N ) ≤ LS(N ) ≤ LW (N ). (19)
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We first justify the bound Q(N ) ≤ LS(N ), already observed in some sense in Ref. [17]. The
strong locking capacity of the noiseless qubit channel is equal to one, due to the existence of the
FHS locking protocol (see Example 23 below). By concatenating the FHS locking protocol with a
family of capacity-achieving quantum error correcting codes, we obtain a family of strong locking
protocols that achieve a strong locking rate equal to the quantum capacity of the channel. The
bound LS(N ) ≤ LW (N ) follows because a strong locking protocol always meets the demands of
a weak locking protocol (recall Remark 6). The relationship between the private capacity and
the strong locking capacity is less clear. Indeed, a private communication protocol for a quantum
channel protects information only from the environment of the channel (which we think of as
the eavesdropper’s system). For this reason, it does not meet the demands of a strong locking
protocol. However, we could consider a “strong privacy” protocol in which the goal is to protect a
message from both the environment and output of the channel, under the assumption that the party
controlling these systems does not have access to the shared key. In this case, the “strong private
capacity” would always be equal to zero because a sublinear amount of secret key is insufficient to
get any “strong private capacity” out of the channel. For this reason, the bounds in (18)-(19) are
the best simple ones that we can derive from operational considerations.
We can also consider the case in which a classical feedback channel is available for free from the
receiver to the sender. In this case, we denote the resulting capacities with a superscript (←). By
employing the same operational arguments as above, we find that the following inequalities hold
Q(←)(N ) ≤ P (←)(N ) ≤ L(←)W (N ) ≤ C(←)(N ), (20)
Q(←)(N ) ≤ L(←)S (N ) ≤ L(←)W (N ). (21)
Capacities assisted by classical feedback need not be equal to the unassisted capacities. For example,
it is known that the quantum and private capacities assisted by classical feedback can be strictly
larger than the corresponding unassisted capacities [33], and this is true even for the classical
capacity [47]. The locking capacity of quantum channels with classical feedback remains largely an
open question.
5.2 Upper bounds on the locking capacity
Let us define the information quantity L
(u)
W (N ) as follows:
L
(u)
W (N ) ≡ max
{p(x),ρx}
[I(X;B)− Iacc(X;E)], (22)
where the above information quantities are evaluated with respect to a state of the following form:∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ UNA→BE(ρx), (23)
UNA→BE is an isometric extension of the channel N , and the superscript (u) indicates that this
quantity will function as an upper bound on the locking capacity. The following theorem establishes
that the regularization of L
(u)
W (N ) provides an upper bound on the weak locking capacity of a
quantum channel. This bound is nontrivial given that the regularization of L
(u)
W (N ) does not
depend on the secret key used in a given locking protocol.
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Theorem 10. The weak locking capacity LW (N ) of a quantum channel N is upper bounded by the
regularization of L
(u)
W (N ):
LW (N ) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
L
(u)
W
(N⊗n).
Proof. The proof below places an upper bound on the weak locking capacity of a quantum channel
by considering the most general protocol for this task. Suppose that the task is to generate shared,
locked randomness rather than to send a locked message (placing an upper bound on achievable
rates for this task gives an upper bound on achievable rates for the latter task, since a protocol for
the latter task can be used to accomplish the former task). The most general protocol has Alice
input her share of the key K and her variable M into an encoder that outputs some systems An to
be fed into the inputs of the channels. She then transmits these systems An over the channel, so
that Bob receives the output systems Bn. Let the following state describe all systems at this point
in the protocol:
ωMKBn ≡ 1|M||K|
∑
m,k
|m〉〈m|M ⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗N⊗nA→B(ρk,m).
Bob inputs his share of the key K and the systems Bn into a decoder D
KBn→Mˆ to recover Mˆ ,
which is his estimate of Alice’s variable M . The final state of the protocol is given by
ω′
MMˆ
≡ 1|M||K|
∑
m,k
|m〉〈m|M ⊗DKBn→Mˆ
[|k〉〈k|K ⊗N⊗nA→B(ρk,m)].
If the protocol is any good for locking the message M , then the ideal distribution of M and Mˆ
deviates from the actual distribution of these variables by no more than ε, in the sense that∥∥∥ΦMMˆ − ω′MMˆ∥∥∥1 ≤ ε,
where
Φ
MMˆ
≡ 1|M|
∑
m
|m〉〈m|M ⊗ |m〉〈m|Mˆ .
The above condition is equivalent to the condition that Pr{Mˆ 6=M} ≤ ε/2 because
1
2
∥∥∥ΦMMˆ − ω′MMˆ∥∥∥1 = Pr{Mˆ 6=M}.
Also, from Remark 4, Eve’s accessible information Iacc(M ;E
n) about the variable M is bounded
from above by ε′′n, where ε′′ ≡ h2(ε/2)/n + εR/2, whenever (14) is satisfied. We can now proceed
with bounding achievable rates for any locking protocol:
nR = H(M)Φ
= I(M ; Mˆ )Φ
≤ I(M ; Mˆ )ω′ + nε′
≤ I(M ;BnK)ω + nε′
= I(M ;Bn)ω + I(M ;K|Bn)ω + nε′
≤ I(M ;Bn)ω − Iacc(M ;En)ω + o(n) + nε′ + nε′′
≤ L(u)W
(N⊗n)+ o(n) + nε′ + nε′′.
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The first equality follows from the assumption that the random variable M is a uniform random
variable. The second equality is an identity because H(M |Mˆ ) = 0 for the ideal distribution on M
and Mˆ . The first inequality follows from an application of the Alicki-Fannes-Audenart inequality
(continuity of entropy) [1, 2], where ε′ is a function of ε that approaches zero as ε→ 0. The second
inequality follows from an application of quantum data processing (both Bn and K are fed into
the decoder to produce Mˆ). The third equality follows from an application of the chain rule for
mutual information. The third inequality follows from the upper bound
I(M ;K|Bn) ≤ H(K|Bn) ≤ H(K) ≤ o(n),
(the assumption that the secret key rate is sublinear) and from the accessible information bound
Iacc(M ;E
n) ≤ ε. The final inequality follows from optimizing over all distributions, so that we
have
R ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
L
(u)
W
(N⊗n).
in the limit as n becomes large and as ε→ 0.
Theorem 11. The strong locking capacity LS(N ) of a quantum channel N is upper bounded as
LS(N ) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
L
(u)
S
(N⊗n),
where
L
(u)
S (N ) ≡ max
{p(x),ρx}
[I(X;B)− Iacc(X;BE)],
and the information quantities are with respect to the state in (23).
Proof. The proof of this theorem is nearly identical to the proof of the one above. However, we
employ the bound on the accessible information Iacc(M ;A
n) = Iacc(M ;B
nEn) from Definition 2
and Remark 4 instead.
Remark 12. Observe that the bounds in the above theorem hold even if the key is allowed to be a
sublinear size quantum system, as in the locking schemes discussed in [15].
It is an interesting and important open question to determine if the upper bounds given in the
above theorems are achievable.
5.2.1 Entanglement-breaking channels have zero locking capacity
The above theorems and a further analysis allow us to determine that both the strong and weak
locking capacities of an entanglement-breaking channel are equal to zero.
Definition 13 (Entanglement-breaking channel [29]). A channel NEB is entanglement-breaking if
the output state is separable whenever it acts on one share of an entangled state:
(idR⊗NEB)(ρRA) =
∑
x
pX(x)σ
x
R ⊗ ωxB ,
where pX(x) is a probability distribution, each σ
x
R is a state on the reference system R, and each
ωxB is a state on the channel output system B.
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Theorem 14. Both the strong and weak locking capacities of an entanglement-breaking channel
NEB are equal to zero:
LW (NEB) = LS(NEB) = 0.
Proof. The proof of this theorem exploits the upper bound derived in Theorem 10 and the fact
that LW (NEB) ≥ LS(NEB). We know from Ref. [29] that any entanglement-breaking channel has
a representation with rank-one Kraus operators, so that its action on an input density operator is
given by
NEB(ρ) =
∑
y
|φy〉B〈ψy|Aρ|ψy〉A〈φy|B,
for some set of vectors {|ψy〉A} such that
∑
y|ψy〉〈ψy|A = IA and a set of states {|φy〉B}. An
isometric extension of the channel is then given by
UNEBA→BE ≡
∑
y
|φy〉B〈ψy|A ⊗ |y〉E ,
with {|y〉E} an orthonormal basis for the environment. From this representation, it is clear that
the channel to the environment is of the form:
N cEB(ρ) =
∑
y,z
〈ψy|ρ|ψz〉A 〈φz|φy〉B |y〉〈z|E ,
and the environment can simulate the channel to the receiver by first performing a von Neumann
measurement in the basis {|y〉} followed by a preparation of the state |φy〉B conditioned on the
measurement outcome being y.
Now consider the information quantity L
(u)
W (NEB) defined in (22). Theorem 10 states that the
regularization of this quantity is an upper bound on the weak locking capacity. For any finite n, we
can always pick the measurement to be a tensor-product von Neumann measurement of the form
mentioned above, giving that
Iacc(X;E
n) ≥ I(X;Y n),
where Y n is the random variable corresponding to the measurement outcomes. Due to the structural
relationship given above (the fact that the environment can simulate the channel to the receiver by
preparing n quantum states |φy1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φyn〉 from the measurement outcomes yn), we find that
I(X;Y n) ≥ I(X;Bn),
by an application of the quantum data processing inequality. This is equivalent to I(X;Bn) −
I(X;Y n) ≤ 0, which implies that limn→∞ 1nL
(u)
W
(N⊗nEB ) = 0 and thus that the weak locking capacity
vanishes for any entanglement-breaking channel.
Remark 15. The importance of the above theorem is the conclusion that a channel should be able
to preserve entanglement between a purification of the channel input and its output in order for it to
be able to lock information. If it is not able to (i.e., if it is entanglement-breaking), then the locking
capacity is equal to zero. Ref. [6] suggested that entanglement does not play a role in quantum data
locking, but this theorem shows that it does in any realistic implementation of a locking protocol.
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Remark 16. It should be possible to provide a rigorous generalization of this result to entanglement-
breaking channels defined over general infinite-dimensional spaces using the techniques from Ref. [27].
For example, it is known that a lossy bosonic channel becomes entanglement-breaking when the en-
vironment injects a thermal state with sufficiently high photon number [27]. However, we leave this
question open for future work.
5.2.2 Protocols with classical simulations have zero strong locking rate
It is important to determine the conditions for when the locking rate of a given protocol is zero, so
that we can distinguish between the classical and quantum regimes for locking. In this regard, we
can exclude all protocols that have a classical simulation in the following sense:
Definition 17 (Classical simulation). We say that a locking protocol has a classical simulation if
the receiver’s decoding consists of performing a measurement on the output of the channel that is
independent of the key K, followed by a classical post-processing of the measurement output and
the key to produce an estimate of the transmitted message.
Theorem 18. The strong locking rate of any locking protocol with a classical simulation is equal
to zero.
Proof. The fact that this theorem should hold might be obvious, but nevertheless we provide a
proof. The setup for this proof is similar to that in the proof of Theorems 10 and 11, with the
exception that the decoder first performs a key-independent measurement of the channel output to
produce a random variable Y . The decoder then processes the random variable Y and the key K
to produce an estimate Mˆ of the sender’s message. We can bound the rate R of this protocol as
follows:
nR = H(M)Φ
= I(M ; Mˆ )Φ
≤ I(M ; Mˆ )ω′ + nε′
≤ I(M ;Y K)ω + nε′
= I(M ;Y )ω + I(M ;K|Y )ω + nε′
≤ I(M ;Y )ω − Iacc(M ;BnEn)ω + o(n) + nε′ + nε′′
≤ I(M ;Y )ω − I(M ;Y )ω + o(n) + nε′ + nε′′
= o(n) + nε′ + nε′′.
The first three lines above are exactly the same as those in the proof of Theorem 10. The sec-
ond inequality follows from quantum data processing. The third equality is the chain rule. The
third inequality follows from the condition Iacc(M ;B
nEn)ω ≤ ε′′n, with ε′′ ≡ h2(ε/2)/n + εR/2,
whenever (14) is satisfied, which should hold for any strong locking protocol. Also, it follows be-
cause I(M ;K|Y )ω ≤ H(K) ≤ o(n). Finally, the adversary can choose her processing of the BnEn
systems to be a discarding of En followed by whatever key-independent measurement of Bn that
the receiver is performing to produce Y . Thus, it follows that Iacc(M ;B
nEn)ω ≥ I(M ;Y ). The
statement that the strong locking rate is equal to zero follows by taking the limit as n → ∞ and
ε→ 0.
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As a corollary of the above theorem, we find the following:
Corollary 19. If a protocol does not consume any secret key at all, then the strong locking rate is
equal to zero.
Proof. This follows simply because the receiver’s measurement on the channel outputs does not
depend on a key for a scheme that does not use any key at all.
5.2.3 The private and quantum capacity are equal to the weak locking capacity for
particular Hadamard channels
In this section, we prove that if the channel is such that the map from the input to the environment
is a quantum-to-classical channel, i.e., of the following form:
ρ→
∑
x
Tr{AxρA†x} |x〉〈x|, (24)
for some orthonormal basis {|x〉} and where ∑xA†xAx = I, then the weak locking capacity of
such a channel is equal to its private and quantum capacity. This result follows simply because
the systems received by the environment are already classical, so that the best measurement for
the adversary to perform is given by {|x〉〈x|} on each channel use. Any measurement other than
this one will have a mutual information with the message lower than this measurement’s mutual
information by a simple data processing argument. Furthermore, since the systems given to the
environment are classical, the Holevo information of the environment with the input is equal to the
accessible information of the environment with the input for such channels.
For such channels, the map from the input to the output is of the following form:
ρ→
∑
x
AxρA
†
x ⊗ |x〉〈x| (25)
because the operator
∑
xAx(·)⊗|x〉⊗|x〉 is an isometric extension of the channel in (24). A notable
example of such a channel is the “photon detected-jump” channel, described in Ref. [20]. Channels
of the form in (25) are examples of Hadamard channels, which are generally defined as channels
complementary to entanglement-breaking ones [30, 31].
We state the above result as the following theorem:
Theorem 20. The weak locking capacity of a channel of the form in (25) is equal to its private
and quantum capacity and is given by the following expression:
max
{pX(x),ρx}
[I(X;B)− I(X;E)],
where the information quantities are evaluated with respect to the following state:∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ UNA→BE(ρx)
with UNA→BE an isometric extension of the channel N .
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Proof. A proof of this theorem follows the intuition mentioned above. In particular, we know from
Refs. [13, 10] that the following formula is equal to the private capacity of any channel:
P (N ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
 max{
pX(x),ρ
(n)
x
}[I(X;Bn)− I(X;En)]

Now, since we are assuming the channel to the environment to have the form given in (24), the
systems given to the environment are classical so that the accessible information Iacc(X;E
n) is equal
to the Holevo information I(X;En) for any finite n. Thus, our upper bound from Theorem 10 on
the weak locking capacity of such a channel is equal to the expression given above for its private
capacity. Furthermore, all Hadamard channels are degradable [7], meaning that the receiver can
simulate the map from the input to the environment by acting with a degrading map on his system.
Finally, it is known that the expression for the private capacity “single-letterizes” to the form in
the statement of the theorem for degradable channels and that the quantum capacity is equal to
the private capacity for such channels [46].
Remark 21. Theorem 20 demonstrates that it suffices to use a private capacity achieving code for
channels of the form in (25), with the benefit that these private communication codes do not require
the consumption of any secret key. That is, there is no need to devise an exotic information locking
protocol for such channels in order to achieve their weak locking capacity.
5.2.4 Quantum discord-based upper bound on the gap between weak locking capacity
and private capacity
The quantum discord is an asymmetric measure that quantifies the quantum correlation in a bipar-
tite quantum state [38]. For a given bipartite quantum state ρAB, the quantum mutual information
I(A;B)ρ quantifies all of the bipartite correlations in ρAB, while maxΛA→X I(X;B) is meant to cap-
ture the classical correlations in the state that are recoverable by performing a local measurement on
the A system [25]. Thus, the idea behind the quantum discord D(A,B)ρ is to quantify the quantum
correlations in a state by subtracting out the classical correlation from the total correlation:
D(A,B)ρ ≡ I(A;B)ρ − max
ΛA→X
I(X;B).
Ollivier and Zurek originally described the quantum discord as the correlations lost during a mea-
surement process [38].
Our upper bound on the weak locking capacity from Theorem 10 appears similar to the above
formula for quantum discord. Indeed, we can place an upper bound on the gap between the
weak locking capacity and the private capacity of a quantum channel in terms of the discord
between the environment of the channel and the classical variable sent into the channel. We can
also interpret this merely as the gap between the Holevo information of the environment and
its accessible information. It is clear why this gap is related to quantum discord. In a private
communication protocol, the security guarantee is with respect to the Holevo information, while
in a locking protocol, the guarantee is with respect to the accessible information. Thus, the gap
between the two capacities should be related to the correlations lost during Eve’s measurement.
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Proposition 22. The gap between the weak locking capacity and the private capacity of a quantum
channel is no larger than
LW (N )− P (N ) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
[
max
{pX(x),ρx}
I(X;En)− Iacc(X;En)
]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
[
max
{pX(x),ρx}
D(En,X)
]
,
where the entropies for any finite n are with respect to a state of the following form:∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗N⊗nA→E(ρx),
and NA→E is the channel complementary to NA→B = N .
Proof. Consider that for any finite n, we have the bound
I(X;Bn)− Iacc(X;En) = I(X;Bn)− I(X;En) + I(X;En)− Iacc(X;En)
≤ max
{pX(x),ρx}
[I(X;Bn)− I(X;En)] + max
{pX(x),ρx}
[I(X;En)− Iacc(X;En)].
Then by using the bound from Theorem 10, the inequality above, and the characterization of
the private capacity as P (N ) = limn→∞ 1n
[
max{pX(x),ρx}[I(X;B
n)− I(X;En)]], the bound in the
statement of the theorem follows.
5.3 Examples
Example 23 (Noiseless qudit channel) The noiseless qudit channel trivially has weak locking
capacity equal to log2 d, where d is the dimension of the input and output for the channel. The
reason for this is that an isometric extension of this channel has the following form:∑
i
|i〉B〈i|A ⊗ |φ〉E .
In this case, Eve’s state is independent of the input, so that her accessible information is always
equal to zero (even without coding in any way).
However, the noiseless qudit channel nontrivially has strong locking capacity also equal to log2 d.
This follows from the results of Fawzi et al. [18], in which they demonstrated the existence of a
locking protocol that locks n dits using 4 log2(1/ε) +O(log2 log2(1/ε)) bits of key while having the
variational distance in (14) for any eavesdropper measurement no larger than ε, for an eavesdropper
who obtains the full output of the noiseless channel. Thus, this scheme is an (n, log2 d, ε) locking
protocol that consumes secret key at a rate equal to
1
n
[4 log2(1/ε) +O(log2 log2(1/ε))].
So, for any fixed ε > 0, we can take n large so that the secret key rate vanishes in this limit, while
the eavesdropper will not be able to do much better than to randomly guess the message. Thus,
this construction gives a scheme to achieve the rate log2 d. Since the strong locking capacity of the
noiseless qudit channel cannot be any larger than log2 d, this proves that it is equal to log2 d for
this channel.
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In reality, one does not ever have access to perfectly independent uses of a quantum channel,
as this is just an idealization. As such, it can be helpful to define the “one-shot” locking capacity
for a single use of a quantum channel. We provide such a definition below:
Definition 24 (One-shot locking capacity). The ε-one-shot locking capacity of a quantum channel
is the maximum number of locked bits that a sender can transmit to a receiver such that the receiver
can recover the message with average error probability less than ε > 0 and such that the total
variational distance of the message distribution conditioned on the eavesdropper’s measurement
outcome x with the unconditioned message distribution pM is no larger than ε:∑
m
|pM |X(m|x)− pM (m)| ≤ ε.
We also demand that the number of secret key bits used is O(log2 log2|M|). Similar to the IID
case, we can distinguish between weak and strong locking capacities.
Example 25 (Depolarizing channel) Recall that the quantum depolarizing channel is defined
as
ρ→ (1− p)ρ+ pI
d
,
where p ∈ [0, 1] characterizes the noisiness of the channel and d is its dimension. For sufficiently
large d, the ε-one-shot strong locking capacity of the depolarizing channel is equal to its ε-one-shot
classical capacity (defined similarly as above—see Ref. [50], for example). This result follows simply
because any unitary encoding commutes with the action of the depolarizing channel on the input
state, and we can employ the FHS protocol combined with an ε-one-shot classical capacity achiev-
ing code, in order to achieve the same ε-one-shot strong locking capacity of the depolarizing channel.
While easy to prove, this example illustrates the subtle interplay between locking, entanglement
and classical communication. The fact that the depolarizing channel’s one-shot strong locking and
classical capacities match regardless of the strength of the noise would seem to leave little room
for quantum correlations to play any role. Indeed, it seems hard to square this result with Theo-
rem 14’s statement that entanglement-breaking channels have zero strong locking capacity, which
is easily adapted to the one-shot setting. The resolution is that for any fixed but arbitrarily large
amount of noise p, the depolarizing channel eventually ceases to be entanglement breaking for some
sufficiently large d = poly(1/p) [21].
Our best known characterization of the locking capacity of the IID memoryless depolarizing channel
is in terms of the operational inequalities given in (18)-(19).
Example 26 (Erasure channel) Consider a d-dimensional quantum erasure channel defined as
ρ→ (1− p)ρ+ p|e〉〈e|,
where |e〉 is an erasure flag state that is orthogonal to the d-dimensional input state. For this
channel, a unitary acting on the input commutes with the action of the channel, so that the same
argument as above demonstrates that the ε-one-shot strong locking capacity of this channel is equal
to its ε-one-shot classical capacity for sufficiently large d.
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The feedback-assisted weak and strong locking capacities of the memoryless erasure channel are
at least (1− p)2 for p ≤ 1/2 and (1− p)/(1 + 2p) for p ≥ 1/2. Furthemore, they are no larger
than 1 − p. These results follow from the best known lower bounds on the quantum capacity of
the erasure channel assisted by classical feedback [33], the fact that the feedback-assisted classical
capacity of the erasure channel cannot exceed 1− p, and the operational inequalities in (21).
Example 27 (Parallelized locking protocols) A simple parallelized protocol (as mentioned in
Ref. [37]) is to employ the FHS protocol for each use of a memoryless depolarizing or erasure channel.
However, the best known statement regarding the parallel composition of locking protocols is given
by Proposition 2.4 of Ref. [18]. That is, if one locking protocol guarantees that the total variational
distance of a message distribution conditioned on the eavesdropper’s measurement outcome x1 with
the unconditioned message distribution pM is no larger than ε1:∑
m1
|pM1|X1(m1|x1)− pM1(m1)| ≤ ε1,
and another guarantees it is no larger than ε2:∑
m2
|pM2|X2(m2|x2)− pM2(m2)| ≤ ε2,
then the parallel composition of these protocols guarantees a total variational distance no larger
than ε1 + ε2: ∑
m1,m2
|pM1,M2|X(m1,m2|x)− pM1,M2(m1,m2)| ≤ ε1 + ε2.
Then consider a simple parallelized protocol consisting of n uses of a d-dimensional channel, where
we suppose that each channel use has a guarantee that the variational distance (as above) is no
larger than γ > 0. Parallel composition of the locking protocols guarantees that the variational
distance for the n channel uses is no larger than γn. By applying the Fannes-Audenaert inequality
[16, 2] as in Proposition 3.2 of Ref. [18], one finds the following bound on the accessible information
of the adversary:
(γn) log dnE + h2(γn),
where dE is the dimension of the environment for a single channel use. Thus, the number of se-
cret key bits needed to guarantee that Eve’s accessible information is no larger than nε is equal
to O(n log2(1/ε)), so that the rate of key used in this scheme grows linearly with the number of
channel uses. Clearly, this approach is less desirable than simply using a one-time pad combined
with a classical capacity achieving code. For this latter protocol, the rate of key is a fixed constant
independent of the number of channel uses and the protocol guarantees perfect secrecy from an
adversary with access to a quantum memory.
In information theory, results for memoryless channels usually follow straightforwardly from their
one-shot counterparts. The linear key growth incurred when parallelizing locking protocols prevents
us from quickly concluding that the non-one-shot strong locking capacities of the depolarizing and
erasure channels match their classical capacities. Moreover, the covariance argument used to draw
that conclusion does not translate directly to the setting of many channel uses. We therefore leave
it as an open question to determine whether the equivalence persists beyond the one-shot setting.
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6 Upper bounds on the locking capacity when restricting to coherent-
state encodings
In this section, we prove that there are fundamental limitations on the locking capacity of channels
when we restrict ourselves to coherent-state encodings. In particular, we prove that the strong
locking capacity of any quantum channel cannot be any larger than
g(NS)− log2(1 +NS),
where g(x) ≡ (x+1) log2(x+1)−x log2 x, when restricting to coherent-state encodings with mean
input photon number NS . Observe that g(NS)− log2(1 +NS) ≤ log2(e), and this latter bound is
independent of the photon number used for the coherent-state codewords. An intuitive (yet not
fully rigorous) reason for why we obtain this bound is that log2(1 +NS) is the rate of information
that an adversary can recover about the message simply by performing heterodyne detection on
each input to the channel, while g(NS) is an upper bound on the classical capacity of any channel
with mean input photon number NS . Thus, the difference of these two quantities should be a
bound on the strong locking capacity.
We also prove that the weak locking capacity of a pure-loss bosonic channel cannot be any
larger than the sum of its private capacity and
g((1− η)NS)− log2(1 + (1− η)NS),
when restricting to coherent-state encodings with mean photon number NS, where η ∈ [0, 1] is the
transmissivity of the channel. As before, g((1− η)NS) − log2(1 + (1− η)NS) ≤ log2(e), which is
independent of the photon number.
We consider a coherent-state locking protocol in which the encrypted states {Uk|m〉} are gen-
eralized to a set of n-mode coherent states {|αn(m,k)〉}m∈M,k∈K, where |αn(m,k)〉 is an n-fold
tensor product of coherent states:
|αn(m,k)〉 ≡ |α1(m,k)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αn(m,k)〉.
Definition 28 (Coherent-state locking protocol). A coherent-state locking protocol consists of
coherent-state codewords {|αn(m,k)〉}m∈M,k∈K depending upon the message m and the key value k.
These codewords are then transmitted over a quantum channel to be decoded by a receiver.
Theorem 29. The strong locking capacity of any channel when restricting to coherent-state encod-
ings with mean photon number NS is upper bounded by g(NS)− log2(1 +NS).
Proof. As described in Definition 28, the encoder for such a scheme prepares a coherent-state
codeword |αn(m,k)〉 at the input of n uses of a quantum channel N , depending upon the messagem
and the key value k. It is useful for us to consider the following classical-quantum state, which
describes the state of the message, key, and input to many uses of the channel:
ρMKAn =
1
|M||K|
∑
m,k
|m,k〉〈m,k|MK ⊗ |αn(m,k)〉〈αn(m,k)|An . (26)
The state after the isometric extension of the channel (unique up to unitaries acting on the envi-
ronment) acts is then as follows:
ρMKBnEn =
1
|M||K|
∑
m,k
|m,k〉〈m,k|MK ⊗ UNAn→BnEn(|αn(m,k)〉〈αn(m,k)|An),
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where UNAn→BnEn is the isometry corresponding to n uses of the given channel. Recall from the
proof of Theorem 11 that we obtain the following upper bound on the strong locking capacity of N :
I(M ;Bn)− Iacc(M ;BnEn) + o(n) + n2ε′. (27)
(Recall that this bound holds for any (n,R, ε) strong locking protocol, with ε′ a function of ε that
vanishes as ε→ 0.) Consider that the information quantity I(M ;Bn) is upper bounded as follows:
I(M ;Bn)ρ ≤ I(M ;An)ρ
= I(MK;An)ρ − I(K;An|M)ρ,
where the first inequality follows from quantum data processing, and the equality follows from the
chain rule for quantum mutual information. We then find that
I(MK;An)ρ = H(A
n)ρ −H(An|MK)ρ
= H(An)ρ, (28)
where the second equality follows because the state on An is a pure coherent state when conditioned
on systems M and K.
On the other hand, we obtain a lower bound on the accessible information Iacc(M ;B
nEn) =
Iacc(M ;A
n) by having the adversary perform heterodyne detection (a particular measurement that
is not necessarily the optimal one) on each of the systems An, giving
Iacc(M ;A
n)ρ ≥ Ihet(M ;An)ρ (29)
= Ihet(MK;A
n)ρ − Ihet(K;An|M)ρ, (30)
where in the second line we again apply the chain rule for mutual information. An ideal n-mode
heterodyne measurement is described by a POVM {d2nβn
πn
|βn〉〈βn|}, where βn is the amplitude of
the n-mode coherent state |βn〉 ≡ |β1〉 · · · |βn〉 and d2nβn denotes the Lebesgue measure on Cn. We
can then compute the heterodyne mutual information Ihet(MK;A
n)ρ as
Ihet(MK;A
n)ρ =W (A
n)ρ −W (An|MK)ρ ,
where
W (Q)σ = −
∫
d2nβn
πn
〈βn|σ|βn〉 log2 〈βn|σ|βn〉 (31)
denotes the Wehrl entropy for a state σ defined on system Q [51] and its conditional version follows
in the natural way. It is easy to see that the Wehrl entropy of an n-mode coherent state is equal
to n log2(e), so we find that
Ihet(MK;A
n)ρ =W (A
n)ρ − n log2(e). (32)
We are now in a position to derive an upper bound on (27). Observe that our development above
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implies that
I(M ;Bn)− Iacc(M ;BnEn) ≤ I(MK;An)ρ − I(K;An|M)ρ
− [Ihet(MK;An)ρ − Ihet(K;An|M)ρ]
≤ I(MK;An)ρ − Ihet(MK;An)ρ
≤ max
pX(x)
[I(X;An)ω − Ihet(X;An)ω]
≤ n max
pX(x)
[I(X;A)σ − Ihet(X;A)σ]
= n
(
log2(e) + max
pX(x)
[H(A)σ −W (A)σ]
)
≤ n [g(NS)− log2(1 +NS)]. (33)
The second inequality follows from data processing: I(K;An|M)ρ ≥ Ihet(K;An|M)ρ (the systemM
is classical, and performing heterodyne detection on An can only reduce the mutual information).
The third inequality follows by taking a maximization over all distributions pX(x) where ωXAn is
a state of the following form:
ωXAn ≡
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |αnx〉〈αnx |An ,
such that the mean input photon number to the channel for each x is NS . The fourth inequal-
ity follows by realizing that the difference between the mutual information and the heterodyne
information is equal to the private information of a quantum wiretap channel in which the state
|αnx〉 is prepared for the receiver while the heterodyned version of this state (a classical variable)
is prepared for the eavesdropper. Such a quantum wiretap channel has pure product input states
(they are coherent states) and it is degraded. Thus, we can apply Theorem 35 from the appendix
to show that this private information is subadditive, in the sense that
max
pX(x)
[I(X;An)ω − Ihet(X;An)ω] ≤ n max
pX(x)
[I(X;A)σ − Ihet(X;A)σ],
where we define the state σXA as follows:
σXA ≡
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |αx〉〈αx|A.
The last equality follows from the observation in (32) and because I(X;A)σ = H(A)σ−H(A|X)σ =
H(A)σ (since the states are pure when conditioned on X).
We now show that the maximizing distribution for maxpX(x)[H(A)σ −W (A)σ] is given by a
circularly-symmetric Gaussian distribution with variance NS , so that the optimal ensemble is a
Gaussian ensemble of coherent states. Indeed, let ̺ be a single-mode quantum state with Tr[a̺] = 0
and Tr[a†a̺] = NS where a
† and a are creation and annihilation operators, respectively. The von
Neumann entropy is given by H(̺) = −Tr[̺ log2 ̺]. We show that
H(̺)−W (̺) (34)
is maximized when ̺ is a thermal state. Our approach is based on a technique used in the appendix
of Ref. [28], which in turn is based on classical approaches to this problem [12]. Let
˜̺= 1
NS + 1
∞∑
m=0
(
NS
NS + 1
)m
|m〉〈m|, (35)
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be a thermal state with mean photon number NS . We will show that
H(˜̺)−W (˜̺)− (H(̺)−W (̺)) ≥ 0 , (36)
holds for any ̺ with Tr[a̺] = 0 and Tr[a†a̺] = NS . Putting
Q̺(β) = 〈β|̺|β〉 , (37)
the left hand side of (36) is equal to
− Tr[˜̺log2 ˜̺] + Tr[̺ log2 ̺] + ∫ d2βπ Q˜̺(β) log2Q˜̺(β)−
∫
d2β
π
Q̺(β) log2Q̺(β)
= Tr[̺(log2 ̺− log2 ˜̺)] + Tr[(̺− ˜̺) log2 ˜̺]
−
{∫
d2β
π
Q̺(β)(log2Q̺(β)− log2Qρ˜(β)) +
∫
d2β
π
(Q̺(β)−Q˜̺(β)) log2Q˜̺(β)
}
= D(̺||˜̺)−D(Q̺||Q˜̺) + Tr[(̺− ˜̺) log2 ˜̺]− ∫ d2βπ (Q̺(β)−Q˜̺(β)) log2Q˜̺(β), (38)
where D(̺||˜̺) and D(Q̺||Q˜̺) are quantum and classical relative entropies, respectively. We can
easily show that their difference is positive by the monotonicity property of the relative entropy.
The third term is
Tr[(̺− ˜̺) log2 ˜̺] = Tr
(̺− ˜̺) ∞∑
m=0
log2
 1NS + 1
(
NS
NS + 1
)a†a|m〉〈m|

= − log2(NS + 1)Tr[̺− ˜̺] + log2( NSNS + 1
)
Tr[(̺− ˜̺)a†a]
= 0. (39)
Similarly, the fourth term is∫
d2β
π
(Q̺(β)−Q˜̺(β)) log2Q˜̺(β)
=
∫
d2β
π
(Q̺(β)−Q˜̺(β))(− log2(NS + 1)− |β|2ln(2)(NS + 1)
)
(40)
= 0. (41)
Note that Q˜̺(β) = 1(NS+1) exp
[
− |β|2
NS+1
]
and we used the fact that if Tr[a†a̺] = Tr[a†aτ ] then∫
d2β Q̺(β) |β|2 =
∫
d2β Qτ (β) |β|2.
As a consequence, we have
H(˜̺)−W (˜̺)− (H(̺)−W (̺)) = D(̺||˜̺)−D(Q̺||Q˜̺) ≥ 0, (42)
which completes the proof that maxpX(x)[H(A)σ −W (A)σ] is optimized by a circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian distribution with variance NS .
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Finally, we can rewrite log2(e) + maxpX(x)[H(A)σ −W (A)σ] as I(X;A)σ − Ihet(X;A)σ for X
complex Gaussian, and these information quantities evaluate to g(NS) − log2(1 +NS) in such a
case. By combining the bounds in (27) and (33), we deduce the following upper bound on the
rate R of any strong locking protocol that employs coherent-state codewords with mean photon
number NS :
R ≤ g(NS)− log2(1 +NS) +
o(n)
n
+ 2ε′,
which converges to g(NS)− log2(1 +NS) in the limit as n→∞ and ε→ 0.
Theorem 30. The weak locking capacity of a pure-loss bosonic channel with transmissivity η ∈ [0, 1]
when restricting to coherent-state encodings with mean input photon number NS is upper bounded
by
max{0, g(ηNS)− g((1− η)NS)}+ [g((1− η)NS)− log2(1 + (1− η)NS)].
The term max{0, g(ηNS)− g((1− η)NS)} is equal to the private capacity of the pure-loss bosonic
channel, while the second term is limited by the bound
[g((1− η)NS)− log2(1 + (1− η)NS)] ≤ log2(e).
Proof. The proof of this theorem is somewhat similar to the proof of the previous theorem. Nev-
ertheless, there are some important differences, and so we give the full proof for completeness.
In the proof of Theorem 10, we obtained the following upper bound on the weak locking capacity:
I(M ;Bn)− Iacc(M ;En) + o(n) + n2ε′. (43)
(Recall that this bound holds for any (n,R, ε) strong locking protocol, with ε′ a function of ε that
vanishes when ε→ 0.) We begin by bounding the quantity I(M ;Bn)− Iacc(M ;En):
I(M ;Bn)− Iacc(M ;En)
≤ I(MK;Bn)− [Ihet(MK;En)− Ihet(K;En|M)]
≤ I(MK;Bn)− Ihet(MK;En) + o(n)
= H(Bn)−W (En) + n log2(e) + o(n)
= H(Bn)−H(En) +H(En)−W (En) + n log2(e) + o(n)
≤ n[max{0, g(ηNS)− g((1− η)NS)}]
+ n[g((1− η)NS)− log2(1 + (1− η)NS)] + o(n).
The first inequality follows from data processing I(M ;Bn) ≤ I(MK;Bn), the fact that Iacc(M ;En) ≥
Ihet(MK;E
n), and the identity Ihet(M ;E
n) = Ihet(MK;E
n)−Ihet(K;En|M). The second inequal-
ity follows because Ihet(K;E
n|M) ≤ H(K) ≤ o(n). The first equality follows from the fact that
I(MK;Bn) = H(Bn) for the pure-loss bosonic channel and from the fact that Ihet(MK;E
n) =
W (En) − n log2(e). The second equality is a simple identity. The final inequality follows because
the entropy difference H(Bn) − H(En) is equal to a coherent information of the n-use pure-loss
bosonic channel. The only relevant property of the input state for which the coherent information is
evaluated is that it has a mean photon number NS , and so the coherent information is always lower
than nmax{0, g(ηNS)− g((1− η)NS)}, which is equal to n times the quantum and private capacity
of this channel [54, 52]. We also employ an argument similar to that in the previous theorem to
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bound H(En)−W (En) + n log2(e) from above by n[g((1− η)NS)− log2(1 + (1− η)NS)]. Finally,
by combining the above bound with the bound in (43), we deduce the following upper bound on
the rate R of any weak locking protocol that employs coherent-state codewords for transmission
over a pure-loss bosonic channel:
R ≤ max{0, g(ηNS)− g((1− η)NS)}+ [g((1− η)NS)− log2(1 + (1− η)NS)] +
o(n)
n
+ 2ε′,
which converges to max{0, g(ηNS)− g((1− η)NS)} + [g((1− η)NS)− log2(1 + (1− η)NS)] in the
limit as n→∞ and ε→ 0.
Remark 31. Given that the private capacity of a pure-loss bosonic channel with mean input photon
number NS is equal to max{0, g(ηNS)− g((1− η)NS)}, the above theorem implies a strong limita-
tion on the weak locking capacity of a pure-loss bosonic channel when restricting to coherent-state
encodings with mean input photon number NS. That is, the weak locking capacity when restricting
to coherent-state encodings cannot be more than 1.45 bits larger than the channel’s private capacity.
Remark 32. These bounds apply in particular to channels that use a coherent-state locking protocol
in which there is a fixed codebook {|αn(m)〉} and the coherent states are encrypted according to
passive mode transformations Uk that transform n-mode coherent states as |αn〉 → |U˜kαn〉, where
U˜kα
n is understood to be a label for a coherent state vector with the following complex amplitudes:U˜
(1,1)
k · · · U˜ (1,n)k
...
. . .
...
U˜
(n,1)
k · · · U˜ (n,n)k

α1...
αn
. (44)
Remark 33. If the coherent-state locking protocol consists of passive mode transformations (as
defined above) for the encryption and the receiver performs heterodyne detection to recover the
message after decrypting with a passive mode transformation, then the strong locking capacity of
a channel using such a scheme is equal to zero. This result follows because such a scheme has a
classical simulation—passive mode transformations commute with heterodyne detection in such a
way that heterodyne detection can be performed first followed by a classical postprocessing of the
measurement data with a matrix multiplication as in (44). That is, the decoding in such a scheme
is equivalent to first performing key-independent heterodyne detection measurements followed by
classical post-processing of the key and the measurement results. Thus, Theorem 18 applies so that
the strong locking capacity of a channel using such a scheme is equal to zero. However, this theorem
does not apply if the receiver performs photodetection because passive mode transformations do not
commute with such a measurement.
From our upper bounds on the locking capacity of channels restricted to coherent-state encod-
ings, it is clear that there are strong limitations on the rates that are achievable when employing
bright coherent states. That is, it clearly would not be worthwhile to invest a large mean input
photon number per transmission given the above limitations on locking capacity that are indepen-
dent of the photon number. In spite of this result, it might be possible to achieve interesting locking
rates with weak coherent states, but we should keep in mind that the above bounds were derived by
considering the information that an adversary can gain by performing heterodyne detection—the
information of the adversary can only increase if she performs a better measurement. Never-
theless, we can determine values of the mean input photon number NS such that the difference
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g(NS) − log2(1 +NS) becomes relatively large. By considering NS ≪ 1, we find the following
expansions of g(NS) and log2 (1 +NS), respectively:
g(NS) ≈
(
−NS lnNS +NS + N
2
S
2
)
log2(e) , (45)
log2 (1 +NS) ≈
(
NS − N
2
S
2
)
log2(e) , (46)
so that the difference g(NS)− log2(1 +NS) ≈
[−NS lnNS+N2S] log2(e) for NS ≪ 1. Indeed, in the
limit as NS → 0, we find that the relative ratio of our upper bound on the strong locking capacity of
a coherent-state protocol to the classical capacity g(NS) of the noiseless bosonic channel approaches
one:
lim
NS→0
g(NS)− log2 (1 +NS)
g(NS)
= 1,
so that there is some sense in which the rate at which we can lock information becomes similar to
the rate at which we can insecurely communicate information if the bound g(NS) − log2 (1 +NS)
is in fact achievable. However, this remains an important open question.
7 One-shot PPM coherent-state locking protocol
In spite of the previous section’s limitations on the locking capacity of coherent-state protocols, we
still think it is interesting to explore what kind of locking protocols are possible using coherent-
state encodings. To this end, we now discuss a one-shot strong locking protocol (in the sense of
Definition 24) that employs a coherent-state encoding. For simplicity, we consider the case of a
noiseless channel, with the generalization to the pure-loss bosonic channel and weak locking being
straightforward.
An explicit scheme for locking using weak coherent states can be obtained by analogy with the
PPM encryption presented in Ref. [37] and reviewed in Section 4.1. Similar to the single-photon
scheme, to encode a message m Alice prepares an n-mode coherent state |αm〉 which is a tensor
product of a single-mode coherent state of amplitude α on the mth mode and the vacuum on the
remaining n− 1 modes:
|αm〉 ≡ |0〉1 . . . |0〉m−1|α〉m|0〉m+1 . . . |0〉n.
(Notice that, as in the single-photon case, the PPM encoding is highly inefficient in terms of number
of modes, as it encodes only log2 n bits into n bosonic modes.) Let us fix Ntot = |α|2 to be the
total mean number of photons involved in the protocol, and
NS ≡ Ntot
n
(47)
to be the mean photon number per mode. Before sending anything to Bob, Alice encrypts a message
by applying a unitary selected uniformly at random (according to the shared secret key) from a set
of |K| n-mode linear-optical passive transformations. If the unitary Uk is used, then the final state
is the n-mode coherent state
Uk|αm〉 =
n⊗
m′=1
|U˜ (m′,m)k α〉 . (48)
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Bob, who knows which unitary has been chosen by Alice, applies the inverse transformation and
performs photodetection on the received modes. He will detect (one or more) photons only in the
mth mode, hence successfully decrypting the message in case of a detection.
Different from the single-photon architecture of Ref. [37], there is a non-zero probability that
Bob’s detector does not click. Analogous to the case of the single-photon locking protocol in the
presence of loss, if no photon is detected, Bob may use a public classical communication channel
to ask Alice to resend, yielding
Iacc(M ;KQ)ρ = Ntot log2 n . (49)
However, the same observations from Section 4.1 apply here. That is, locking is only known to be
secure when the message distribution is uniform, and this is certainly not the case for a feedback-
assisted scheme unless Eve attacks each PPM block independently. If she attacks collectively, then
it is necessary for Alice and Bob to exploit an amount of key necessary to ensure that the message
distribution is uniform.
Assuming that Eve independently attacks each block that she receives, we have to evaluate her
accessible information with respect to the following state:
ρMKQ =
1
n|K|
∑
m,k
|m,k〉〈m,k|MK ⊗
(
Uk|αm〉〈αm|U †k
)
Q . (50)
If the set of n-mode unitaries are selected uniformly at random according to the Haar measure,
one might expect that such a set of unitaries scrambles phase information of α so that it is not
accessible to Eve. Thus, a presumably clever strategy for Eve is to perform a measurement that
commutes with the total number of photons. Such a POVM has elements
{|0〉〈0|, {µ(1)y |φ(1)y 〉〈φ(1)y |}y, {µ(2)y |φ(2)y 〉〈φ(2)y |}y, . . . }, (51)
where |0〉 is the n-mode vacuum, and for any k ≥ 1 each vector |φ(k)y 〉 belongs to the k-photon
subspace. This suboptimal measurement allows Eve to achieve a mutual information Inum(M ;Q)ρ
such that
Inum(M ;Q)ρ ≤ Iacc(M ;Q)ρ. (52)
For small values of Ntot ≪ 1, the probability of having more than one photon is of order N2tot.
We can hence argue that for N2tot ≪ 1, the main contribution to Inum(M ;Q)ρ comes from POVM
elements in (51) with k = 0, 1 and that the contribution of those with k ≥ 2 is, in the worst case,
of order N2tot log2 n. Noticing that the projection of the coherent state Uk|αm〉 in the subspace
spanned by the vacuum and the single-photon subspace is
e−
|α|2
2 (|0〉+ αUk|m〉) = e−
|α|2
2 (|0〉 + α
∑
m′
U˜
(m′,m)
k |m′〉) , (53)
where |m′〉 is the state of a single photon on the m′th mode, a straightforward calculation leads to
the following expression for the lower bound Inum(M ;Q)ρ:
Inum(M ;Q)ρ = Ntot
[
log2 n− min
M
(1)
E
∑
y
µ
(1)
y
n|K|
∑
k
H(qyk)
]
+O(N2tot log2 n) , (54)
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where the optimization is over the POVM M(1)E defined on the single-photon subspace, with ele-
ments {µ(1)y |φ(1)y 〉〈φ(1)y |}i, and qmyk = |〈φ(1)y |Uk|m〉|2.
The expression in square brackets in (54) is formally the same as that in (5). We can hence
bound Inum(M ;Q)ρ using the results of Ref. [18]. It follows that there exist choices of |K| n-mode
passive linear-optical unitaries with
log2 |K| = 4 log2 (ε−1) +O(log2 log2 (ε−1)) , (55)
such that
Inum(M ;Q)ρ ≤ εNtot log2 n+O(N2tot log2 n) , (56)
with ε arbitrarily small if n is large enough.
Clearly, the security condition r1 ≪ 1 can be satisfied only if Inum(M ;Q)ρ ≪ Iacc(M ;QK)ρ. A
necessary condition for r1 ≪ 1 to hold is
ε+O(Ntot)≪ 1 , (57)
which can be fulfilled in the case of weak coherent states, where Ntot ≪ 1. In this regime, the
key-efficiency condition r2 < 1 can be satisfied only if
4 log2 (ε
−1) < Ntot log2 n . (58)
This implies that the value of Ntot has to be in the range
1≫ Ntot > 4 log2 (ε
−1)
log2 n
. (59)
In conclusion, this weak coherent state PPM protocol is analogous to the single-photon one in
the presence of linear loss. In principle the condition in (59) can always be fulfilled for n large
enough, yet the minimum value of n increases exponentially with decreasing key-efficiency ratio r2
and with decreasing Ntot.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we formally defined the locking capacity of a quantum channel in order to establish a
framework for understanding the locking effect in the presence of noise. We can distinguish between
a weak locking capacity and a strong one, the difference being whether the adversary has access
to the environment of the channel or to its input. We related these locking capacities to other
well known capacities from quantum Shannon theory such as the quantum, private, and classical
capacity. The existence of the FHS locking protocol [18] establishes that both the weak and strong
capacity locking capacities are not smaller than the quantum capacity, while the weak locking
capacity is not smaller than the private capacity because a private communication protocol always
satisfies the demands of a weak locking protocol. Furthermore, the classical capacity is a trivial
upper bound on both locking capacities. We also proved that the strong locking capacity is equal
to zero whenever a locking protocol has a classical simulation and that both locking capacities
are equal to zero for an entanglement-breaking channel. This latter result demonstrates that a
channel should have some ability to preserve entanglement in order for non-zero locking rates to
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be achievable. Moreover, we found a class of channels for which the weak locking capacity is equal
to both the private capacity and the quantum capacity.
As an important application, we considered the case of the pure-loss bosonic channel and the
locking capacities for channels restricted to coherent-state encodings. We note that a particular
example of such a protocol is the αη protocol (also known as Y 00) [56]. We found limitations of
the locking capacity for these coherent-state schemes: the strong locking capacity of any channel
is not larger than log2(e) locked bits per channel use while the weak locking capacity of the pure-
loss bosonic channel is not larger than the sum of its private capacity and log2(e) locked bits per
channel use. If the scheme exploits passive mode transformations and the receiver uses heterodyne
detection, the restrictions are as severe as they can be: the strong locking capacity is equal to zero
because there is a classical simulation of such a protocol.
As a final contribution, we discussed locking schemes that exploit weak coherent states and that
might be physically implementable. They are similar to the single-photon quantum enigma machine
(QEM) of Ref. [37], with the exception that information is encoded by pulse position modulation
(PPM) of a coherent state of a given amplitude α, with |α|2 ≪ 1, over n modes. The necessary
conditions for security and key efficiency of this scheme are qualitatively equivalent to that of the
single-photon QEM.
The realization of a proof of principle demonstration of a quantum enigma machine is a tremen-
dous experimental challenge. The main difficulty to overcome concerns the scaling of the physical
resources required for key efficient encryption. Notice that for single-photon PPM encoding, n op-
tical modes are needed to encode log2 n bits, while the required secret key has length of the order
of log2 log2 n. As a consequence, the number of modes increases very quickly if one requires small
values of the key efficiency ratio r2, as defined in (10). Although keeping the same scaling law,
the resources required for a key efficient single-photon QEM become even more demanding when
one introduces loss in the single-photon scheme and when one moves from the single-photon PPM
to the weak coherent-state PPM. On the other hand, in the case of a weak coherent-state QEM,
one can trade off the increase in the number of modes (and/or the reduction in the key efficiency
level) with the fact that coherent states can be prepared deterministically and are much easier to
handle than single-photon states. However, it seems that one has to go beyond PPM encoding to
overcome the key efficiency limitations.
There are many open questions to consider going forward from here. Perhaps the most pressing
question is to determine a formula that serves as a good lower bound on the locking capacities (that
is, one would need to demonstrate locking protocols with nontrivial achievable rates according to
the requirements stated in Definitions 1, 2, and 8). One might suspect that the formulas given in
Theorems 10 and 11 are in fact achievable, but it is not clear to us if this is true. Furthermore, it is
important to determine if there is an example of channel (perhaps many?) for which its weak locking
capacity is strictly larger than its private classical capacity, and similarly, if there is a channel for
which its strong locking capacity is strictly larger than its quantum capacity. We also suspect that
the locking capacity is non-additive, as is the case for other capacities in quantum Shannon theory
[48, 34, 47]. If it is the case that the 50% quantum erasure channel has a weak locking capacity
equal to zero, then it immediately follows from the results of Ref. [47] and our operational bounds
in (18) and (19) that both the weak and strong locking capacities are non-additive.
Another intriguing question is the relationship between the strong locking and quantum iden-
tification capacities [53] of a quantum channel. Both seem to involve a weak form of coherent
data transmission from a sender to receiver. FHS even established an explicit connection between
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locking using unitary encodings and quantum identification over a channel built out of the inverses
of those unitaries [18]. It is tempting to speculate that the single-letter formula for the amortized
quantum indentification capacity found in Ref. [24] could thereby be recruited as a tool to study
the locking capacity.
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A Private capacity of degraded quantum wiretap channels
This appendix contains a proof that the private capacity of a degraded quantum wiretap channel
when restricted to product-state encodings is single-letter. Also, we show by an appeal to Hastings’
counterexample to the additivity conjecture [22] that there exists two quantum wiretap channels
that are degraded but nevertheless have non-additive private information. This latter result pro-
vides a simple answer to a question that has been open since the introduction of weakly degradable
channels [11].
A quantum wiretap channel is defined as a completely positive trace-preserving map NA→BE
from an input system A to a legitimate receiver’s system B and an eavesdropper’s system E. Such
a map has an isometric extension UA→BEF with the property that
NA→BE(ρ) = TrF
{
UA→BEF ρU
†
A→BEF
}
.
The private capacity of a quantum wiretap channel is given by [13, 10]
lim
n→∞
1
n
P
(N⊗nA→BE),
where P (NA→BE) is the private information, defined as
P (NA→BE) ≡ max
{pX(x),ρx}
I(X;B)ρ − I(X;E)ρ, (60)
with the entropies taken with respect to the following classical-quantum state:
ρXBE ≡
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗NA→BE(ρx). (61)
Such a wiretap channel is degraded if there exists a degrading map DB→E such that
DB→E ◦ NA→B = NA→E.
Theorem 34. The private information formula in (60) for two degraded quantum wiretap channels
is generally non-additive. That is, there exists degraded quantum wiretap channels N1 and N2 such
that
P (N1 ⊗N2) > P (N1) + P (N2).
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Proof. This result follows by exploiting the counterexample of Hastings [22] for the Holevo in-
formation formula. Let M1 and M2 be the channels from Hastings’ counterexample, i.e., they
satisfy
χ(M1 ⊗M2) > χ(M1) + χ(M2), (62)
where χ(N ) is the Holevo information of a channel N . We then construct our quantum wiretap
channels M1 and M2 as N1(ρ) = M1(ρ) ⊗ σE and N2(ρ) = M2(ρ) ⊗ σE. Both channels are
obviously degraded wiretap channels because the channel to the environment simply prepares a
constant state σE . Also, there is no dependence of the environment’s output on the input state, so
that the private informations of these channels reduce to Holevo informations:
P (N1 ⊗N2) = χ(M1 ⊗M2),
P (N1) = χ(M1),
P (N2) = χ(M2).
Thus, the inequality in the statement of the theorem follows from (62).
Theorem 35. The private information of a degraded quantum wiretap channel is additive when
restricted to product state encodings.
Proof. First, consider that we can always restrict the optimization in the private information for-
mula to be taken over pure input states whenever the quantum wiretap channelNA→BE is degraded.
Indeed, consider the extension state
ρXY BE ≡
∑
x,y
pX(x)pY |X(y|x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗NA→BE(ψx,y), (63)
where we are using a spectral decomposition for each state ρx:
ρx =
∑
y
pY |X(y|x)ψx,y.
Thus, the state in (61) is a reduction of the state in (63). Now consider that
I(X;B)ρ − I(X;E)ρ = I(XY ;B)− I(XY ;E)− [I(Y ;B|X)− I(Y ;E|X)]
≤ I(XY ;B)− I(XY ;E)
≤ P (NA→BE).
The first equality is from the chain rule for mutual information. The first inequality follows by
exploiting the degrading condition and from the fact that X is classical. The final inequality follows
by considering XY as a joint classical system, so that the private information of the channel can
only be larger than I(XY ;B)− I(XY ;E).
Now consider an isometric extension UA→BEF of a quantum wiretap channel NA→BE. By using
the fact that the private information is optimized for pure state ensembles, we can always rewrite
it as
I(X;B)− I(X;E) = H(B)−H(E)−H(B|X) +H(E|X)
= H(B)−H(E)−H(B|X) +H(BF |X)
= H(B)−H(E) +H(F |BX), (64)
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where in the second line we used the fact that H(E|X) = H(BF |X) for pure-state ensembles.
Now we show the additivity property for product-state ensembles. Consider the following state
on which we evaluate information quantities:
σXB1E1F1B2E2F2 ≡
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ UA1→B1E1F1(φx)⊗ UA2→B2E2F2(ψx),
where we are restricting the signaling states to be product and without loss of generality we can
take them to be pure as shown above. Consider that
I(X;B1B2)σ − I(X;E1E2)σ
= H(B1B2)σ −H(E1E2)σ +H(F1F2|B1B2X)
= H(B1)σ +H(B2)σ −H(E1)σ −H(E2)σ − [I(B1;B2)σ − I(E1;E2)σ] +H(F1F2|B1B2X)
≤ H(B1)σ +H(B2)σ −H(E1)σ −H(E2)σ +H(F1|B1X) +H(F2|B2X)
= [I(X;B1)− I(X;E1)] + [I(X;B2)− I(X;E2)].
The first equality follows from the identity in (64). The second equality follows from entropy
identities. The first inequality follows from the degraded wiretap channel assumption, so that
I(B1;B2)σ − I(E1;E2)σ ≥ 0 and by applying strong subadditivity of entropy [35] three times to
get that H(F1F2|B1B2X) ≤ H(F1|B1X)+H(F2|B2X). The last equality follows from the identity
in (64) and the fact that we are restricting to product-state signaling ensembles.
References
[1] Robert Alicki and Mark Fannes. Continuity of quantum conditional information. Journal of
Physics A: Mathematical and General, 37(5):L55–L57, 2004.
[2] Koenraad M. R. Audenaert. A sharp continuity estimate for the von Neumann entropy. Journal
of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical, 40(28):8127, 2007.
[3] Howard Barnum, Emanuel Knill, and Michael A. Nielsen. On quantum fidelities and channel
capacities. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 46:1317–1329, 2000.
[4] Howard Barnum, Michael A. Nielsen, and Benjamin Schumacher. Information transmission
through a noisy quantum channel. Physical Review A, 57(6):4153–4175, June 1998.
[5] Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and
coin tossing. In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers Systems and
Signal Processing, pages 175–179, Bangalore, India, December 1984.
[6] Sergio Boixo, Leandro Aolita, Daniel Cavalcanti, Kavan Modi, and Andreas Winter. Quantum
locking of classical correlations and quantum discord of classical-quantum states. International
Journal of Quantum Information, 9:1643–1651, 2011.
[7] Kamil Bra´dler, Patrick Hayden, Dave Touchette, and Mark M. Wilde. Trade-off capacities of
the quantum Hadamard channels. Physical Review A, 81:062312, June 2010. arXiv:1001.1732.
[8] Aiden Bruen and Mario A. Forcinito. Cryptography, Information Theory, and Error-
Correction: A Handbook for the 21st Century. Wiley-Interscience, 2004.
34
[9] Harry Buhrman, Matthias Christandl, Patrick Hayden, Hoi-Kwong Lo, and Stephanie Wehner.
Possibility, impossibility, and cheat sensitivity of quantum-bit string commitment. Physical
Review A, 78:022316, August 2008.
[10] Ning Cai, Andreas Winter, and Raymond W. Yeung. Quantum privacy and quantum wiretap
channels. Problems of Information Transmission, 40(4):318–336, October 2004.
[11] Filippo Caruso and Vittorio Giovannetti. Degradability of bosonic Gaussian channels. Physical
Review A, 74:062307, December 2006. arXiv:quant-ph/0603257.
[12] Thomas M. Cover and Joy A. Thomas. Elements of Information Theory. Wiley-Interscience,
2006.
[13] Igor Devetak. The private classical capacity and quantum capacity of a quantum channel.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 51:44–55, January 2005.
[14] David P. DiVincenzo, Micha l Horodecki, Debbie W. Leung, John A. Smolin, and Barbara M.
Terhal. Locking classical correlations in quantum states. Physical Review Letters, 92:067902,
February 2004. arXiv:quant-ph/0303088.
[15] Fre´de´ric Dupuis, Jan Florjanczyk, Patrick Hayden, and Debbie Leung. Locking classical infor-
mation. November 2010. Submitted to the Proceedings of the Royal Society A. arXiv:1011.1612.
[16] Mark Fannes. A continuity property of the entropy density for spin lattices. Communica-
tions in Mathematical Physics, 31:291, 1973.
[17] Omar Fawzi. Uncertainty relations for multiple measurements with applications. PhD thesis,
McGill University, August 2012. arXiv:1208.5918.
[18] Omar Fawzi, Patrick Hayden, and Pranab Sen. From low-distortion norm embeddings to
explicit uncertainty relations and efficient information locking. Proceedings of the 43rd annual
ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 773–782, 2011. arXiv:1010.3007.
[19] Vittorio Giovannetti, Saikat Guha, Seth Lloyd, Lorenzo Maccone, Jeffrey H. Shapiro, and
Horace P. Yuen. Classical capacity of the lossy bosonic channel: The exact solution. Physical
Review Letters, 92(2):027902, January 2004.
[20] Markus Grassl, Zhengfeng Ji, Zhaohui Wei, and Bei Zeng. Quantum-capacity-approaching
codes for the detected-jump channel. Physical Review A, 82:062324, December 2010.
arXiv:1008.3350.
[21] Leonid Gurvits and Howard Barnum. Largest separable balls around the maximally mixed
bipartite quantum state. Physical Review A, 66(6):062311, 2002. arXiv:quant-ph/0204159.
[22] Matthew B. Hastings. Superadditivity of communication capacity using entangled inputs.
Nature Physics, 5:255–257, April 2009. arXiv:0809.3972.
[23] Patrick Hayden, Debbie Leung, Peter W. Shor, and Andreas Winter. Randomizing quantum
states: Constructions and applications. Communications in Mathematical Physics, 250(2):371–
391, July 2004. arXiv:quant-ph/0307104.
35
[24] Patrick Hayden and Andreas Winter. Weak decoupling duality and quantum identification.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 58(7):4914–4929, 2012. arXiv:1003.4994.
[25] Leah Henderson and Vlatko Vedral. Classical, quantum and total correlations. Journal of
Physics A: Mathematical and General, 34(35):6899–6905, 2001.
[26] Alexander S. Holevo. The capacity of the quantum channel with general signal states. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 44:269–273, 1998.
[27] Alexander S. Holevo. Entanglement-breaking channels in infinite dimensions. Problems of
Information Transmission, 44(3):171–184, September 2008. arXiv:0802.0235.
[28] Alexander S. Holevo, Masaki Sohma, and Osamu Hirota. Capacity of quantum Gaussian
channels. Physical Review A, 59:1820–1828, March 1999.
[29] Micha l Horodecki, Peter W. Shor, and Mary Beth Ruskai. Entanglement breaking channels.
Reviews in Mathematical Physics, 15(6):629–641, 2003. arXiv:quant-ph/0302031.
[30] Christopher King. An application of the Lieb-Thirring inequality in quantum information
theory. Fourteenth International Congress on Mathematical Physics, pages 486–490, 2003.
arXiv:quant-ph/0412046.
[31] Christopher King, Keiji Matsumoto, Michael Nathanson, and Mary Beth Ruskai. Properties
of conjugate channels with applications to additivity and multiplicativity. Markov Processes
and Related Fields, 13(2):391–423, 2007. J. T. Lewis memorial issue, arXiv:quant-ph/0509126.
[32] Robert Ko¨nig, Renato Renner, Andor Bariska, and Ueli Maurer. Small accessible quantum in-
formation does not imply security. Physical Review Letters, 98:140502, April 2007. arXiv:quant-
ph/0512021.
[33] Debbie Leung, Joungkeun Lim, and Peter Shor. Capacity of quantum erasure channel assisted
by backwards classical communication. Physical Review Letters, 103:240505, December 2009.
arXiv:0710.5943.
[34] Ke Li, Andreas Winter, XuBo Zou, and Guang-Can Guo. Private capacity of quantum channels
is not additive. Physical Review Letters, 103(12):120501, September 2009.
[35] Elliott H. Lieb and Mary Beth Ruskai. Proof of the strong subadditivity of quantum-mechanical
entropy. Journal of Mathematical Physics, 14:1938–1941, 1973.
[36] Seth Lloyd. Capacity of the noisy quantum channel. Physical Review A, 55(3):1613–1622,
March 1997.
[37] Seth Lloyd. Quantum engima machines. 2013. arXiv:1307.0380.
[38] Harold Ollivier and Wojciech H. Zurek. Quantum discord: A measure of the quantumness of
correlations. Physical Review Letters, 88:017901, December 2001.
[39] Valerio Scarani, Helle Bechmann-Pasquinucci, Nicolas J. Cerf, Miloslav Dusˇek, Norbert
Lu¨tkenhaus, and Momtchil Peev. The security of practical quantum key distribution. Re-
views of Modern Physics, 81:1301–1350, September 2009. arXiv:0802.4155.
36
[40] Benjamin Schumacher. Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information, chapter Infor-
mation from quantum measurements, pages 29–37. Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences
of Complexity, vol. VIII. Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, California, 1990.
[41] Benjamin Schumacher. Sending entanglement through noisy quantum channels. Physical
Review A, 54(4):2614–2628, October 1996.
[42] Benjamin Schumacher and Michael A. Nielsen. Quantum data processing and error correction.
Physical Review A, 54(4):2629–2635, October 1996.
[43] Benjamin Schumacher and Michael D. Westmoreland. Sending classical information via noisy
quantum channels. Physical Review A, 56(1):131–138, July 1997.
[44] Claude Shannon. Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell System Technical Journal,
28(4):656–715, 1949.
[45] Peter W. Shor. The quantum channel capacity and coherent information. In Lecture Notes,
MSRI Workshop on Quantum Computation, 2002.
[46] Graeme Smith. Private classical capacity with a symmetric side channel and its application
to quantum cryptography. Physical Review A, 78(2):022306, August 2008.
[47] Graeme Smith and John A. Smolin. Extensive nonadditivity of privacy. Physical Review
Letters, 103:120503, September 2009. arXiv:0904.4050.
[48] Graeme Smith and Jon Yard. Quantum communication with zero-capacity channels. Science,
321:1812–1815, September 2008.
[49] John A. Smolin and Jonathan Oppenheim. Locking information in black holes. Physical Review
Letters, 96:081302, February 2006.
[50] Ligong Wang and Renato Renner. One-shot classical-quantum capacity and hypothesis testing.
Physical Review Letters, 108:200501, May 2012. arXiv:1007.5456.
[51] Alfred Wehrl. General properties of entropy. Reviews of Modern Physics, 50:221–260, April
1978.
[52] Mark M. Wilde, Patrick Hayden, and Saikat Guha. Quantum trade-off coding for bosonic
communication. Physical Review A, 86:062306, December 2012. arXiv:1105.0119.
[53] Andreas Winter. Identification via quantum channels. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
7777:217–233, 2013. arXiv:1212.0494.
[54] Michael M. Wolf, David Perez-Garcia, and Geza Giedke. Quantum capacities of bosonic
channels. Physical Review Letters, 98:130501, March 2007. arXiv:quant-ph/0606132.
[55] Aaron Wyner. The wire-tap channel. Bell System Technical Journal, 54(8):1355–1387, 1975.
[56] Horace P. Yuen. KCQ: A new approach to quantum cryptography I. General principles and
key generation. 2003. arXiv:quant-ph/0311061.
37
